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KIBEL

ARTICLE
Climate Adaptation Policy at the
Continental Level:
Natural Resources in North America and Europe
PAUL STANTON KIBEL 

I.

INTRODUCION: COMING TO TERMS

As the field of climate change law and policy has evolved over
the past decade, new terminology has also emerged. Two
concepts that have garnered considerable attention are “climate
proofing” and “climate policy coherence.”
The concept of climate proofing is based on the recognition
that, regardless of whether we will be able to reduce greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions in the future, climate change is occurring
now and due to past GHG emissions, levels will continue to occur
in the coming decades.1 This reality calls for adapting our built
environment, protected natural resources, as well as laws and


Associate Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law (San Francisco,
California), LL.M, Boalt Hall Law School, University of California at Berkeley;
B.A., Colgate University. Of counsel to and former partner with water and
natural resources group at Fitzgerald Abbott & Beardsley. Editor of Rivertown:
Rethinking Urban Rivers (MIT Press) and author of The Earth on Trial:
Environmental Law on the International Stage (Routledge). The article expands
on the author’s comments to the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) of the
North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation in conjunction
with JPAC’s Climate Policy Coherence in North America workshop (held in
Denver, Colorado on June 22, 2009).
1. GROUP ON WATER AND CLIMATE, GUIDANCE TOWARDS CLIMATE PROOFING OF
WATER MANAGEMENT 1 (2007).
The Guidance builds on the notion that climate change is a reality; the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its latest
assessment report concluded that the global climate is in fact changing,
and this change will affect the hydrological cycle and thus water
availability as well as water services. Adaptation to a certain degree of
climate change is therefore inevitable.

Id.
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policies to account for climate change consequences. Europe’s
Task Force on Water and Climate described climate proofing as
the “methodology to asses the resilience of water management
and water services to cope with climate change.”2 A more
extensive definition of climate proofing was set forth in the Asian
Development Bank’s 2005 report, Climate Proofing: A Risk-Based
Approach to Adaptation:
[A] shorthand term for identifying risks to a development
project, or any other specified natural or human asset, as a
consequences of climate variability and change, and
ensuring that those risks are reduced to acceptable levels
through
long-lasting
and
environmentally
sound,
economically viable, and socially acceptable changes. . .3
Climate proofing posits that we can avoid some of the more dire
adverse effects of sea level rise, increased evaporation of surface
freshwater and elevated temperatures through appropriate
modification of how we manage land and water resources.
The concept of climate policy coherence proposes that more
integrated strategic cooperation between different governmental
entities—including different countries—is a critical component to
making progress on both GHG emissions reduction and improved
climate proofing. For instance, in June 2009, the North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NACEC) hosted a
regional workshop in Denver, Colorado titled Climate Policy
Coherence in North America. The June 2009 NACEC workshop
evaluated, among other things, whether there were adequate
bilateral and trilateral governance structures in place for
Canada, Mexico and the United States to effectively coordinate
climate adaptation strategies for cross-border resources such as
Similarly, in January 2009, the
international rivers.4
Partnership for European Environmental Research (PEER)
released its report, Climate Policy Integration, Coherence and
Governance, which noted the ways in which continent-wide
European Union (EU) programs impact climate proofing efforts:
2. Id. at 2 (on file with author).
3. ASIAN DEV. BANK, CLIMATE PROOFING: A RISK-BASED APPROACH TO
ADAPTATION xii (2005) (on file with author).
4. The author attended and participated in the June 2009 NACEC
workshop. Workshop materials indicating title on filed with author.
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If adaptation to climate change is to be integrated into
policies that affect agriculture or water, the EU level has to
be included because the Common Agricultural Policy and
the Water Framework Directive set vital frameworks in
these fields.5
This article assesses the extent to which the concepts of
climate proofing and climate policy coherence have found
expression in continental natural resource regimes established in
North America and Europe. The article first examines the
recognition of these concepts within three North American crossborder regimes directly impacted by climate change: the Waters
Treaty between Mexico and the United States; the Pacific Salmon
Treaty between Canada and the United States; and the North
American Waterfowl Management Plan between Canada, Mexico
and the United States. Next it considers the extent to which
these concepts are reflected in recent European initiatives related
to water resources, transboundary watercourses and the Danube
River Basin. The article concludes with a comparative assessment as to why the pace and scope of continental climate
adaptation policy in North America and Europe has differed.
II. NORTH AMERICA’S CROSS-BORDER NATURAL
RESOURCE REGIMES: SLOW TO ADAPT
A. Mexico-United States Waters Treaty and Colorado
River Flow
The 1944 Waters Treaty between Mexico and the United
States allocates the waters of the Colorado River, as well as the
Rio Grande and Tijuana River.6 The Mexico-United States
allocation of the Colorado River—which allocates 1.5 million-acre
feet (MAF) annually to Mexico—was premised on the hydrological
assumption of just over 16 MAF annual flows.7 Domestically,
pursuant to the 1922 Colorado River Compact, the United States
has allocated 14 MAF between “Upper Basin” states (Colorado,
5. P’SHIP FOR EUROPEAN ENVTL. RESEARCH, CLIMATE POLICY INTEGRATION,
COHERENCE AND GOVERNANCE 67-68 (2009) (on file with author).
6. Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, T.S. No. 994 [hereinafter 1944 Waters Treaty].
7. Id. at 55.

3

KIBEL

476

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming) and “Lower Basin” states
(Arizona, California and Nevada).8 The 1944 Waters Treaty
provides that, in the event the United States is unable to meet its
1.5 MAF Colorado River delivery obligation to Mexico due to
“extraordinary drought” conditions (a term not defined in the
treaty), the matter can be referred to the International Boundary
and Water Commission (IBWC) to try to forge a resolution.9
It is now recognized that the 16 MAF total annual flow, that
provided the basis for the Colorado River provisions in the 1944
Waters Treaty, was flawed due to the sample years relied upon
for the Mexico-United States allocation. More specifically, the
early 20thCentury data relied upon to support the 16 MAF flow
turned out to be the result of particularly wet years.10 In 1965, it
was reported that the Colorado River’s reliable natural flow was
14% less than assumed, and more recent reports estimate that
average flows were 22% less and the 16 MAF premise may have
overestimated the long-term flow by 2 MAF.11
To date, the on-river storage provided by Lake Mead (behind
Hoover Dam) and Lake Powell (behind Glen Canyon Dam) has
provided sufficient additional water supplies such that the United
States has so far been able to meet its Colorado River water
delivery obligations to Mexico. Yet, as a Fall 2008 report by the
Water Education Foundation’s Colorado River Project explained,
the drought conditions over the past decade have now begun to
severely test the Colorado River allocation regime: “A year ago,
the Colorado River Basin was enduring the seventh dry year of
the past eight. Inflow into Lake Powell was 68 percent of average
and combined storage of Powell and Lake Mead was roughly 50
percent of capacity.”12 Similarly, in a March 2009 article in High
Country News magazine, special counsel John Carlson to the
Colorado River Water Conservation District observed: “Lake
Meade and Lake Powell provide the backup capacity that ensures
8. Colorado River Compact, 1922, available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/
pao/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf.
9. 1944 Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 6.
10. Matt Jenkins, How Low Will It Go?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Mar. 2, 2009,
at 12; JAMES LAWRENCE POWELL, DEAD POOL: LAKE POWELL, GLOBAL WARMING
AND THE FUTURE OF WATER IN THE WEST 7 (2008).
11. Id.
12. Sue McClurg, Colo. River Project, How is the Colorado River Shortage
Agreement Working?, RIVER REPORT 11 (2008).
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enough water . . . After nearly a decade of drought, the reservoirs
are half-empty. If they continue to drop that will touch off a fight
over what little water is in the river, like creditors battling over
the carcass of a bankrupt company . . . .”13
The drought conditions over the past decade prompted the
United States Department of the Interior to adopt the Colorado

River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and the
Coordinated Operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead (Colorado
River Interim Guidelines) in December 2007, to address the
allocation of diminished Colorado River water supplies between
Arizona, California and Nevada.14 However, the Colorado River
Interim Guidelines did not address the question of whether
deliveries to Mexico pursuant to the 1944 Waters Treaty might be
affected as a result of such drought-related shortages.
Against this backdrop, there are now indications that what
has been referred to as “drought” conditions over the past decade
can be explained in part as a manifestation of the effects of
climate change on the Colorado River basin hydrology. A review
of the science to date on this question was provided by James
Lawrence Powell, Executive Director of the National Physical
Science Consortium at the University of Southern California. In
his 2008 book Dead Pool: Lake Powell, Global Warming and the
Future of Water in the West (published by University of
California Press), Powell reports:
Higher temperatures obviously cause more and faster
melting, but does not the same amount of meltwater flow
downstream, only sooner?
Evidently not.
Warmer
temperatures not only melt snow, they cause it to
sublimate—to pass directly from solid into vapor without
going through the liquid phase. Think of clouds of carbon
dioxide vapor streaming from a block of dry ice. Water
vapor from subliminated snow wafts away on the wind, to
condense and rain somewhere, just not necessarily in the
river basin where it originated.15
....

13. Jenkins, supra note 10, at 14.
14. Id. at 11.
15. POWELL, supra note 10, at 21-22.
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The climate models portray a twenty-first century Colorado
River basin that is hotter but no wetter.
Warmer
temperatures not only reduce the size of the snowpack and
cause it to melt sooner, they increase evaporation from
snow and soils, as well as transpiration from plant leaves
(together called evapotranspiration). Setting aside the
relatively small percentage of rainfall that sinks into the
soil, runoff is essentially the difference between
precipitation and evapotranspiration. . .16
....
If precipitation remains constant while evapotranspiration
increases by just 2 percent, runoff decline by nearly 14
percent. If precipitation falls by 1 percent and evapotranspiration increases by the same 2 percent, runoff dips
by 22 percent. Thus not only is the water balance in the
Colorado River basin poised on a razor’s edge between
supply and demand, even a tiny increase in
evapotranspiration causes a multiplied and dangerous
decrease in runoff.17
....
Assimilating these different studies, one would certainly be
justified in assuming that global warming will reduce
runoff in the Colorado River by 20 percent by mid-century.
To assume no reduction would be imprudent or worse.18
James Lawrence Powell’s observations coincide with the
conclusion reached in a 2007 report by the National Academy of
Sciences-National Research Council (NRC), titled Colorado River

Basin Water Management: Evaluating and Adjusting to
Hydroclimatic Variability. The NRC report determined that
“warmer regional temperatures and the specter of recurrent
drought points to a future in which the potential for conflict
among existing and prospective new users will prove endemic.”19
Within the context of the IBWC and Mexico-United States
diplomatic relations, the question of adapting the Colorado River

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 179.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 181.

NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT:
EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY (2007).
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binational regime to reflect climate change impacts has been
raised obliquely in recent years. In August 2007, a Joint MexicoUnited States Statement on Lower Colorado River Issues was
released. This Joint Statement provided: “authorities from both
nations agree that the IBWC, a treaty-based bilateral
organization with over a century of successful collaboration,
should be utilized to expedite discussions in coming weeks to
further Colorado River cooperation. Among the issues expected
to be addressed are . . . continued needs of both nations for water
for urban, agricultural and environmental purposes, the study of
the hydrological system and potential impacts of climate change,
including the effects of the ongoing historic Colorado River
drought. . . .”20
In March 2008, the IBWC announced new Terms of

Reference for Mexico-United States Joint Cooperative Actions—
Colorado River Users. In these Terms of Reference, one of
Mexico’s

listed

“objectives”

is

“Evaluation

of

current

climatological conditions and future shortage conditions” and one
of the United States listed “objectives” is to “Evaluate potential
climate change impacts on Colorado River hydrology.”21
According to persons directly involved in the IBWC Terms of
Reference process, to date climate change effects and adaptation
have not been considered as autonomous issues but rather have
been addressed under the broader umbrella of discussions
relating to chronic long-term drought and water supply
shortages.22
Finally, in January 2009, former United States Secretary of
the Department of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne and Mexico’s
Ambassador to the United States Arturo Saruukhan issued a
Joint Declaration on Colorado River Issues. This Joint
Declaration stated:

20. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Kempthorne
Announces Joint U.S.-Mexico Statement on Lower Colorado River Issues (Aug.
13, 2007) (emphasis added).
21. International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S. & Mex., Terms of
Reference: United States-Mexico Joint Cooperative Actions-Colorado River
Users (Mar. 11, 2008) (unpublished document, on file with author) (emphasis
added).
22. Telephone Conversation with Jennifer Pitt, Senior Resource Analyst,
Environmental Defense Fund (Sept. 2009).
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Whereas recent periods of historic drought in the Colorado
River Basin and growing recognition of the potential
adverse impacts of climate change have stimulated efforts
to identify cooperative and innovative approaches to ensure
that the Colorado River allotment of each nations will
continue to meet the needs of both nations . . . Secretary
Dirk Kempthorne and Ambassador Arturo Sarukhan
hereby applaud the efforts of the IBWC and its work to
help identify cooperative and innovative measures that
both countries could implement consistent with the
provisions of the 1944 Treaty to help ensure that the
Colorado River is able to continue to meet the needs of both
nations and . . . Further, both government support these
efforts to identify innovative opportunities for water
conservation,
storage,
supply
augmentation,
and
environmental protection, which are viewed as
complementary to the mission of the Department of the
Interior and the respective Mexican ministries, consistent
with the provisions of the 1944 Treaty.23
The December 2007 Joint Statement, the March 2008 Terms
of Reference and the January 2009 Joint Declaration all mention
the potential impacts of climate change on Colorado River
hydrology, but it remains to be seen whether these brief
references will translate into a substantive dialogue regarding
the terms and operation of the 1944 Waters Treaty allocation
regime.
Based on positions set forth by the United States in the
context of previous efforts to address Colorado River supply
shortages, there remain some grounds for skepticism as to
whether such a substantive bilateral dialogue on climate change
effects will be forthcoming, at least on the United States’ side.
More specifically, in 2004 the United States Department of the
Interior prepared a Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
for a proposed Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation
Program. Although comments on the Draft EIS for this program
faulted the analysis for failing to take into account anticipated
climate change-related impacts on Colorado River basin

23. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Kempthorne, Mexican
Ambassador Sarukhan Sign Declaration Commending On-Going Partnership in
the Management of the Colorado River (Jan. 15, 2009) (emphasis added).
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hydrology, the United States Department of the Interior
responded as follows:
Reclamation [the Bureau of Reclamation, a subagency of
the United States Department of the Interior] believes that
the use of actual data recorded over the past century
provides the best basis for ongoing Colorado River
management activities . . . If Reclamation were to use a
different modeling approach . . . it would conflict with all
of the other Colorado River management actions and
analyses that Reclamation has taken and is currently
taken. Attempting to predict global changes in climate,
shifts in demographic patterns, and other factors affecting
Colorado River hydrology are far more speculative than
Reclamation’s reliance on actual annual hydrological data.24
The dismissive approach towards climate change impacts
reflected in the 2004 EIS for the Lower Colorado River MultiSpecies Conservation Program has changed somewhat in more
recent years. In 2007, the United States Department of the
Interior approved the Colorado River Interim Guidelines for

Lower Basin Shortage and the Coordinated Operations for Lake
Powell and Lake Mead (Lower Basin Shortage Interim
Guidelines).25 In the 2007 EIS that accompanied the final Lower
Basin Shortage Interim Guidelines, the question of climate
change effects on Colorado River flow was given more substantive
consideration.26 As reported in a January 2009 article by Carly
Jerla and Jim Prairie of the United States Bureau of
Reclamation:
Acknowledging and responding to the potential impacts of
climate change and increased hydrologic variability, [the
Bureau of] Reclamation empanelled a group of leading
climate expects during the Interim Guidelines development
process. The Climate Technical Work Group assessed the
state of knowledge regarding climate change in the Basin

24. Carly Jerla & Jim Prairie, Lower Colorado River Multi-Species
Conservation Program: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement/Environmental Impact Report, in DEAD POOL: LAKE POWELL, GLOBAL
WARMING AND THE FUTURE OF WATER IN THE WEST 182 (2008).
25. Id.
26. Id.

9
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and prioritized future research and development objectives.
Their findings and recommendations were published as an
appendix to the Final EIR (Appendix U) and are soon to be
re-published, with no change in content, as a stand-alone
report. The recommendation of the Work Group was to
include a qualitative discussion of climate change and
variability accompanied by a quantitative sensitivity
analysis using paleoclimate evidence. This became
Appendix N of the Final EIS.27
In the context of the EIS prepared for the Lower Basin
Shortage Interim Guidelines, the formation of a Climate
Technical Working Group and the inclusion of Appendix N and
Appendix U suggest a greater willingness to recognize the
potential effects of climate change on Colorado River hydrology.
However, even in this instance, this recognition did not translate
into proposals for actual climate adaptation measures. The Final
EIS for the Lower Basin Shortage Interim Guidelines did not
factor Appendix N’s climate change modeling and projections into
its alternatives analysis or recommendations, explaining: “Based
on the current inability to precisely project future impacts of
climate change . . . this final EIS is based on the re-sampled
historical record.”28
The United States’ increasing willingness to acknowledge
potential climate impacts in the water sector was also evidenced
by the federal Environmental Protection Agency’s 2008 report
titled National Water Program Strategy: Response to Climate
Change.29 This publication recognized that “in some parts of the
country, drought, changing patterns of precipitation and
snowmelt, and increased water loss due to evaporation as a result
of warmer air temperatures will result in changes to the
27. Carly Jerla & Jim Prairie, Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower
Basin Shortages and the Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake
Mead & Efforts Addressing Climate Change and Variability, INTERMOUNTAIN
WEST CLIMATE SUMMARY, Jan. 2009, at 5-7.
28. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION UPPER AND LOWER
COLO. REGIONS, RECLAMATION: MANAGING WATER IN THE WEST, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR
LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND
LAKE MEAD 9, 14 (2007), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/
strategies/FEIS/index.html.
29. EPA, NATIONAL WATER PROGRAM STRATEGY: RESPONSE TO CLIMATE
CHANGE (2008).
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availability of water for drinking and for use for agriculture and
industry”30 and that “limited water availability and drought in
some regions will require drinking water providers to reassess
supply facility plans and consider alternative pricing, allocation
and water conservation options.”31 The 2008 National Water
Program Strategy report, however, was fairly tentative and vague
in regard to proposed responses to these water sector impacts. Its
“action” items provided:
The National Water Program will explore opportunities
with States and drinking water systems to better address
expected impacts of climate change on water supply and
water usage rates through water conservation and water
resources management.32
....
The National Water Program will promote technologies to
identify and address leakage from water pipes and other
conveyances.33
....
The National Water Program will work to publish a
document describing a process through which utilities can
conduct a self-analysis of sustainability, including a
climate-change specific vulnerability analysis.34
These action items are thin on specifics, in terms of what the
federal government will do and when. Moreover, and significantly, the 2008 National Water Program report makes no
mention of the Colorado River specifically, or of the need for
potential changes in the way interstate and international rivers
(such as the Colorado) are allocated. This does not suggest that
examination of climate adaptation in the Mexico-United States
Colorado River regime is presently a priority for the United
States.
Professor and water law scholar Dan Tarlock has discussed
some of the reasons that international water allocations regimes
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at ii.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 49.
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(such as the Mexico-United States Colorado River regime) may
face difficulty adapting to climate change impacts.35 In his law
review article, entitled How Well Can International Water
Allocation Regimes Adapt to Global Climate Change?, Tarlock
posits that such adaptation may be hindered by the international
regime’s lack of flexibility in terms of adjusting water allocations
fixed pursuant to treaty provisions, and by the fact that treaty
provisions usually subordinate ecosystem/instream protection to
water development and usage concerns.36 Tarlock’s analysis
helps to explain why there has to date been reluctance to directly
address the impacts of climate change on the existing United
States-Mexico Colorado River regime, but also underscores that
there are compelling reasons why this reluctance should
nonetheless be overcome.
Should Mexico and the United States prove willing to look
more closely at how climate change will affect the bilateral
allocation regime established for the Colorado River, a fruitful
starting point for this examination might be the “extraordinary
drought” provisions under the 1944 Waters Treaty.37 These
treaty provisions establish the process and criteria to address
situations where climatic conditions prevent the United States
from delivering the specified 1.5 MAF of Colorado Water to
Mexico.38 In the context of rising temperatures and greater
evaporation resulting from climate change, the “extraordinary
drought” conditions that have occurred over the past decade may
simply be symptomatic of the new “ordinary” conditions. A 2009
study by the North American Center for Transboundary Studies
reported:
Both droughts and floods may become more extreme as a
result of global climate change. In 2009, the Border
Governors Conference committed to a binational drought
science workshop. In this workshop, experts modeled the
effects of climate change on local hydrological cycles. These
models suggest longer, deeper droughts in the southwest of
the United States and in the west of Mexico in the future.
35. Dan Tarlock, How Well Can International Water Allocation Regimes
Adapt to Global Climate Change?, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 423 (2000).
36. Id. at 423-24.
37. 1944 Waters Treaty, supra note 6, art. 2.
38. Id.
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Some models show the U.S. missing its treaty water
delivery obligation to Mexico on the Colorado River for two
thirds of the remaining years in the century.39
This suggests that modifications to the existing bilateral Colorado
River allocation regime may be needed to better reflect the
current climate-induced hydrological realities.
B.

Canada-United States Pacific Salmon Treaty and
Coldwater Fisheries

The 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty, between Canada and the
United States, seeks to deter overfishing of regional salmon
stocks through a system of allocated fishing rights.40 This binational fishing rights allocation scheme was deemed necessary
because salmon originating in the rivers/streams of Canada often
spend a significant part of their lifecycle feeding and growing in
the off-shore ocean waters of the United States and vice-versa.41
Recognizing that salmon fishing can take place in both waters
and inland rivers/streams, the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty
focused less on defining whether particular salmon stocks are
“Canadian” or “American” and more on working to ensure that
overall fishing levels were sustainable and that fishing rights
were equitably allocated (based in large part on the location of
the inland rivers/stream where salmon originated) between the
two nations.42 This origination focus was reflected in Article
III(1)(b) of the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty, which provides for
“each party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of
salmon originating in its waters.”43
The governing body

39. N. Am. Ctr. for Transboundary Studies, Memo on Water, in RETHINKING
SEEKING COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS TO COMMON

THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER:
PROBLEMS 25 (2009).

40. See generally Treaty between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the United States Concerning Pacific Salmon, U.S.-Can., Jan. 28,
1985, State Dep’t No. 98-149, 1998 WL 646161 [hereinafter 1985 Pacific Salmon
Treaty], available at http://www.psc.org/pubs/treaty.pdf.
41. M.P. SHEPARD & A.W. ARGUE, THE 1985 PACIFIC SALMON TREATY: SHARING
CONSERVATION BURDENS AND BENEFITS 96-119 (2005).
42. Id.
43. 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 40, art. III.
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established to implement the agreement is the Pacific Salmon
Commission.44
Although the negotiations of the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty
understood the essential role that river/stream habitat plays in
the lifecycle of salmon (and therefore the abundance and
productivity of salmon stocks), the issue of habitat conservation
was not directly addressed in the initial agreement.45 The 1999
Agreement on the Pacific Salmon Treaty was adopted, in part, to
foster improved habitat conservation measures in Canada and
the United States.46
Over the past decade, an increased body of scientific
literature has addressed the question of climate change impacts
on North American salmon fisheries.47 Much of this literature
has focused on how increasing air temperatures affect the
temperature in river/stream habitat where salmon spawn and
migrate, and the corresponding impact of such higher
river/stream temperatures on salmon stock reproduction and
survival rates.48
For instance, in May 2002 the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) and Defenders of Wildlife co-authored report
titled Effects of Global Warming on Trout and Salmon in U.S.
Streams.49 This report found:
Because trout and salmon are known to be intolerant of
warm water, their distribution and/or abundance could be
44. Id. at 5.
45. EUGENE H. BUCK, THE PACIFIC SALMON TREATY: THE 1999 AGREEMENT AND
RENEGOTIATION OF ANNEX IV 20 (2007).
46. 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 40, at 121.
47. See generally PATTY GLICK, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, FISH OUT OF WATER: A
GUIDE TO GLOBAL WARMING AND PACIFIC NORTHWEST RIVERS (2005), available at
http://www.nwf.org/News-and-Magazines/Media-Center/News-by-Topic/GlobalWarming/2005/~/media/PDFs/Global%20Warming/Fish_Out_of_Water_2005_FI
NAL.ashx; KIRKMAN O’NEAL, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE & NRDC, EFFECTS OF
GLOBAL WARMING ON TROUT AND SALMON IN U.S. STREAMS (2002) [hereinafter
EFFECTS OF GLOBAL WARMING ON TROUT AND SALMON], available at
http://www.defenders.org/resources/publications/programs_and_policy/science_a
nd_economics/global_warming/effects_of_global_warming_on_trout_and_salmon.
pdf; JAMES BATTIN ET AL., PROJECTED IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON SALMON
HABITAT RESTORATION (2007).
48. The author generally refers to all of the sources in the previous citation.
49. See generally EFFECTS OF GLOBAL WARMING ON TROUT AND SALMON, supra
note 47.
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threatened if future climate change warms the streams
they inhabit . . . We find that trout and salmon habitat is
indeed vulnerable to the effects of global warming. Based
on emissions scenarios A1 and A2 from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) we estimate that
individual species of trout and salmon could lose 5-17% of
their existing habitat by the year 2030, 14-34% by 2060
and 21-42% by 2090, depending on the species considered
and model used . . . Projected effects on trout and salmon
are lower for IPCC emissions B1 and B2 . . . For these
scenarios, we estimate habitat losses of 4-20% by 2030, 731% by 2060, and 14-36% by 2090, depending on fish
species and model.50
The May 2002 NRDC-Defenders of Wildlife report went on to
conclude:
This study supports an abundant scientific literature in
concluding that highly-valued cold water fisheries are
vulnerable to severe losses of habitat from the warming of
streams. We estimate that 18-38% of presently suitable
stream locations would become unsuitable for all trout and
salmon by the year 2090. Projected losses occur for all of
the eight species modeled, and across all regions of the U.S.
with existing cold water habitat. Estimated losses are
substantial, regardless of the general circulation model or
emissions scenarios used for the calculations.51
As another example, in April 2007, scientists with the United
States National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Fisheries Service Center and the University of Washington
published a study with the National Academy of Sciences, titled

Projected Impacts on Climate Change in Salmon Habitat
Restoration, showing how global warming could result in a 2040% decline in Chinook salmon populations by 2050 for the State
of Washington’s Snohomish River Basin.52
This NOAAUniversity of Washington study also found that habitat
deterioration resulting from climate change is likely to make

50. Id. at 3.
51. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
52. BATTIN ET AL., supra note 47.
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salmon recovery more difficult throughout the Pacific Northwest,
particularly in higher elevation basins.53
The 1999 Agreement on the Pacific Salmon Treaty
establishes a framework that could enable Canada and the
United States to better collaborate on adaptation policies relating
to the adverse impact of climate change on salmon habitat.
Attachment D under the 1999 Agreement on the Pacific Salmon
Treaty is titled Renewed Cooperation on Scientific and
Institutional Matters, and provides:
[R]ecognizing the advantages of consultation and
cooperation on science and information exchanged . . .
Recognizing the benefits of processes for getting
information for management, including the development of
common assessment model . . . The Government of Canada
and the Government of United States agree to . . . (d)
request the Commission [Pacific Salmon Commission] to
eliminate the Committee on Research and Statistics and to
reconstitute itself as the Committee on Scientific
Cooperation . . . (i) assist in the consultation with the
scientific and technical committees of the Commission in
setting the scientific agenda for the Commission, including
identifying emerging issues and subject for research and
monitoring progress . . . (iv) undertake the tasks assigned
to it in the agreement on Habitat and Restoration . . . .54
Attachment E under the 1999 Agreement on Pacific Salmon
Treaty is titled Habitat and Restoration, and provides:
Recognizing that protection and restoration of salmon
habitat and maintenance of adequate water quality and
quantity are vital to achieving improved spawning success,
safe passage of adult and juvenile salmon, and therefore,
optimum production of naturally spawning stocks . . . the
Parties agree . . . (1) To use their best efforts, consistent
with applicable law, to (1) protect and restore habitat so as
to promote safe passage and adult and juvenile salmon and
achieve high levels of natural productions . . . (b) maintain
and, as needed, improve safe passage of salmon to and from

53. Id.
54. 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 40, art. XV, IV, ch. 7, Attachment
E (emphasis added).
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their natal streams, and (c) maintain adequate water
quality and quantity . . . (2) to promote these objectives by
requesting the Commission [Pacific Salmon Commission] to
report annually to the Parties on . . . (b) non-fishing factors
affecting the safe passage of salmon as well as the survival
of juvenile salmon . . . (c) options for addressing non-fishing
constraints and restoring optimum production . . . (3) The
Committee on Scientific Cooperation, when constituted,
shall in consultation with the scientific and technical
committees of the Pacific Salmon Commission (the
“Commission”) provide advice to the Commission for
referral to the Parties regarding non-fishing factors
affecting the safe passage and optimum production of
salmon.55
Because adaptation of salmon habitat policies to rising
climate-induced water temperatures qualifies as an “emerging
issue” meriting closer scientific assessment, and because climateinduced rising water temperatures qualifies as a “non-fishing
factor/constraint” affecting the production and survival of salmon
stocks, such matters fall within the scope of Attachment D and E
to the 1999 Agreement on the Pacific Salmon Treaty. Such
matters could be made a priority by the Committee on Scientific
Cooperation which in turn could advise the Pacific Salmon
Commission on what steps Canada and the United States should
take to address these concerns.
There have been calls for the bilateral institutions of the
Pacific Salmon Treaty to more directly confront climate change
effects. For instance, in February 2007, the Pacific Salmon
Commission met in Portland, Oregon.56 At this meeting, Ron
Sims, Executive of Kings County, Washington (where Seattle is
located) urged the Pacific Salmon Commission to establish a
working group to develop a Climate Change Preparedness Plan
for Salmon Management, explaining:
Our discussions about managing precious natural
resources like salmon should start with a discussion about
how we are going to prepare for and adapt to climate
55. 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 40, art. XV, IV, ch. 7, Attachment
D (emphasis added).
56. Ron Sims, Submission to Pacific Salmon Commission (2007) (on file with
author).
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change . . . Less snowpack means less water in our rivers
during the summer and possibly lethal river water
temperatures. . . . For this region to be successful in
sustaining our native salmon through foreseeable and
unforeseeable climate impacts, it is essential for harvest
managers to work in unison with habitat and hatchery
managers to understand the issue and prepare ourselves to
act and adapt.57
Kathleen Miller of the National Center for Atmospheric
Research (in Boulder, Colorado) has written, in her report Pacific

Salmon Fisheries: Climate, Information and Adaptation in a
Conflict-Ridden Context, that Canada and the United States need
“to come to grips with the fact that there may be long term
natural trends in abundance that have nothing to do with their
previous management activities.”58 Miller suggests, however, that
serious questions remain as to whether the Pacific Salmon
Commission will be up to the task: “institutions typically develop
over time to manage competition, but they may be either well or
poorly suited to adapting to the effects of climate variability and
climate change. Climatic variation can disrupt cooperative
resource management arrangements by upsetting expectations,
altering incentives to cooperate or by contributing to
misjudgments regarding the state of the resource or the actions of
the other parties.”59
Notwithstanding the recommendations of those such as Sims
and Miller, to date there is little evidence that climate change
adaptation has emerged as a scientific or policy priority within
the Pacific Salmon Treaty regime.
Should Canada and the United States show a greater
inclination to use the framework and institutions of the Pacific
Salmon Treaty to improve climate adaptation efforts in regards to
coldwater fisheries habitat, the “origination” assumptions and
provisions of the treaty may provide an appropriate initial focus.
To recall, under the Pacific Salmon Treaty, the allocations (in
terms of fishing and catch) between Canada and the United
57. Id. at 26.
58. Kathleen A. Miller, Pacific Salmon Fisheries: Climate, Information and
Adaptation in a Conflict-Ridden Context, 45 CLIMATE CHANGE 21 (2000) (on file
with author).
59. Id. at 21-22.
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States are based on assumptions regarding the volume of Pacific
salmon that “originate” respectively in each nation’s freshwater
rivers and streams. However, as a result of adverse climate
change impacts on spawning habitat due to rising in-stream
temperatures, the respective volume of “originating” salmon in
both the United States and Canada could change with
implications for the biological rationale for the underlying Pacific
Salmon Treaty allocation regime. Therefore, retention of the
current allocation between Canada and the United States could
be made contingent on the extent to which each nation is taking
affirmative steps to “climate proof” salmon habitat from rising
temperatures.
Because higher-elevation freshwater streams may be less
susceptible to lethal in-stream temperature increases than
corresponding lower-elevation streams, one apparent climate
adaptation strategy for salmon is to improve and expand access to
higher-elevation upstream spawning grounds in both Canada and
the United States, possibly through the removal or modification
of on-stream dams that currently block passage to these higherelevation reaches.
As the organization Trout Unlimited
suggested in its 2007 report, Healing Troubled Waters: Preparing
Trout and Salmon Habitat for a Changing Climate: “Dams,
culverts and other blockages to fish movement that are obsolete
or unneeded should be removed to . . . increase the likelihood of
fish finding suitable habitat conditions.”60
The type of “upstream adaptation” approach proposed by
Trout Unlimited falls within the broader category of climate
adaptation strategies that are increasingly referred to as
“assisted migration.”61 As explained in a recent law review
article:
Over the next several decades, as the effects of global
climate change are realized, the suitable habitats for many
plant and animal species will shift to higher latitudes or
altitudes, and many species may not be able to follow on
60. TROUT UNLIMITED, HEALING TROUBLED WATERS: PREPARING TROUT AND
SALMON HABITAT FOR A CHANGING CLIMATE 9 (2007).
61. See Bob Holmes, Assisted Migration: Helping Nature to Relocate, NEW
SCIENTIST, Oct. 6, 2007, at 46; see also Jason S. McLachlan et al., A Framework
for Debate of Assisted Migration in an Era of Climate Change, 21 CONSERV.
BIOL. 297 (2007).
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their own . . . Assisted migration is simply the action of
picking up and moving certain individuals or populations of
species that either cannot or will not be able to migrate on
their own in response to the rapidly changing climatic
conditions expected over the next several decades. This
failure to migrate may be due to the nature of the species
itself . . . or because the habitat has become so fragmented
due to human development that migration to the new
suitable areas is impossible. Assisted migration efforts
may include the less invasive method of creating new
migratory corridors through which species could migrate
independently.62
An example of how such “upstream adaptation” strategies
might be pursued is the current prospect of removal for four aging
dams on the Snake River (a major tributary to the mainstem of
the Columbia River) in the United States.63 In 2009, the Salmon
Solutions and Planning Act was introduced in the United States
House of Representatives, and called for evaluating whether Ice
Harbor Dam, Lower Monumental Dam, Little Goose Dam and
Lower Granite Dam on the Snake River should be
decomissioned.64 The removal of these dams would provide
salmon with improved access to upstream higher elevation
spawning habitat, which in turn could help preserve or increase
the number of salmon “originating” in United States waters per
the allocation regime in the Pacific Salmon Treaty.
C.

North American Waterfowl Management Plan and
Coastal Wetlands

Canada, Mexico and the United States have worked to better
protect threatened migratory bird species through the Migratory
Bird Treaty and the North American Waterfowl Management

62. Julie Lurman Joly & Nell Fuller, Advising Noah: A Legal Analysis of
Assisted Migration, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10413, 10413-14 (2009).
63. Kim Murphy, If Salmon Can't Be Saved, Snake River Dams May Have to
Go, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2009.
64. Scott Learn, Salmon Bill Would Put Removal of Snake River Dams Back
on Table, OR. ENVTL. NEWS, Aug. 3, 2009.
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Plan (NAWMP).65 The Migratory Bird Treaty was signed by
Canada and the United States in 1918 and was signed by Mexico
in 1936.
The Migratory Bird Treaty was prompted by
overhunting due to the market for bird feathers, and focused on
restricting hunting and the sale and marketplace for such bird
products.66 The NAWMP, signed by the United States and
Canada in 1986 and joined by Mexico in 1994, is targeted not at
hunting and the trade in bird products but rather at preserving
and enhancing habitat for migratory waterfowl such as coastal
wetlands.67 Since 1986, it is estimated that the NAWMP has
helped secure over 3,000,000 acres of bird habitat, with 500,000
of these acres receiving permanent protection and the remaining
2.5 million acres in conservation programs that are not
permanent in nature (e.g. conservation easements for a specified
duration).68
Extensive loss of coastal wetlands currently protected under
the NAWMP (and related national programs in Canada, Mexico
and the United States) is expected due to inundation resulting
from climate-induced glacier melting and sea rise. James Titus,
Sea Level Rise Program Coordinator for the United States
Environmental Protection Agency has written: “If sea level rises a
few meters over the next few centuries, everything that the
federal wetlands protection programs has accomplished in the
coastal zone will be for naught because the wetlands protected
will be underwater.”69 Titus has further noted that, at least in
the United States, the “federal regulatory program is making no
effort to enable wetlands to migrate inland as sea level rises.”70

65. Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-12 (2006); U.S. FISH
& WILDLIFE SERV. & CANADIAN WILDLIFE SERV., NORTH AMERICAN WATERFOWL
MANAGEMENT PLAN: A STRATEGY FOR COOPERATION (1996).
66. KURKPATRICK DORSEY, DAWN OF CONSERVATION DIPLOMACY: U.S.CANADIAN WILDLIFE PROTECTION TREATIES IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 165-77
(1998).
67. ASSESSMENT STEERING COMMITTEE, PLAN COMM. OF N. AM. WATERFOWL
MGMT. PLAN, NORTH AMERICAN WATERFOWL MANAGEMENT PLAN, CONTINENTAL
PROGRESS ASSESSMENT, FINAL REPORT 9 (2007) [hereinafter CONTINENTAL
PROGRESS ASSESSMENT].
68. Id. at 22.
69. James C. Titus, Does the U.S. Government Realize that the Sea is

Rising? How to Restructure Federal Program So That Wetlands and Beaches
Survive, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 717, 765 (2000).
70. Id. at 762.
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The loss of coastal wetlands to climate-induced sea rise has
been noted by others as well. In June 2005, the National Wildlife
Federation published The Waterfowler’s Guide to Global
Warming. This publication noted:
As the climate warms, a possible 3-34-inch rise in average
seas by 2100 could eliminate up to 45% of coastal wetlands
in the contiguous United States. Especially vulnerable are
the shallow wetlands of the Gulf and Atlantic coasts.
These regions provide important wintering habitat for
diving ducks such as canvasbacks, redheads, ruddy ducks,
scaup, northern pintails, and lessen snow geese.71
....
Sea level rise, in particular, is likely to significantly reduce
viable winter habitat for numerous waterfowl, especially
where coastal wetlands and other natural ecosystems are
restricted by developments such as sea walls and dikes,
which limit the ability to spread inland when coastal
conditions change. Left unchecked, global warming is
expected to cause global sea levels to rise by 3-34 inches by
2100—a rate up to five times faster than that of the past
century. The loss of coastal wetlands in the contiguous
United States alone due to this amount of sea-level rise is
estimated at 17 to 43 percent in areas without structural
protection of dry land, and at 20 percent to 45 percent
where structures such as sea walls are present.72
....
While the most important strategy we can undertake to
prevent broad-scale loss of wildlife and habitat due to
global warming is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the
nation must also begin to develop strategies to help species
and ecosystems cope with some changes that are
inevitable, as well as build in the flexibility to deal with
those impacts that may be unforeseen. For waterfowl,
taking the potential impacts and uncertainties associated
with global warming into consideration in efforts such as

71. NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, THE WATERFOWLER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL WARMING 4
(2005), available at http://online.nwf.org/site/DocServer/Waterfowlers_Guide_
June_2005.pdf? docID=363.
72. Id. at 20.
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the North American Waterfowl Management Plan and
other relevant resource management activities will help
ensure that our conservation successes will endure for
generations to come.73
In his July 2008 testimony before the United States House of
Representatives on Natural Resource, Subcommittee on
Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans, the chief biologist for the
waterfowl conservation organization Ducks Unlimited, Dale
Humburg, explained:
Climate change, accepted by the scientific community as a
global reality, will impact every aspect of our environment,
including North America’s wetlands and waterfowl.
Although specific impacts are difficult to predict, changing
precipitation patterns, greater variability in weather,
rising sea levels, species extinctions and extreme weather
events are among expected outcomes. From a waterfowl
perspective, climate change is expected to alter wetlands
habitats in all priority waterfowl landscapes. Integrating
predictions of climate change into wetlands and waterfowl
planning will involve considerations of impacts of sea level
rise on coastal wetlands, accounting for known climatic
variations in conservation planning, and taking climate
change into consideration when selecting the location and
other characteristics of conservation areas.74
In terms of coastal wetlands, a key climate adaptation
strategy is to permit such wetlands to migrate landward as sea
levels rise. This approach was highlighted in the January 2009
report by the United States-based Association of State Wetlands
(ASWM) Managers, titled Recommendations for a National
Wetlands and Climate Change Initiative.75 The ASWM report
73. Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added).
74. Dale D. Humburg, Chief Biologist, Ducks Unlimited, Testimony before
the U.S. H.R. Comm. on Natural Res., Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, &
Oceans: Going Going Gone? An Assessment of the Global Decline in Bird
Populations (July 10, 2008), available at http://www.ducks.org/Conservation/
GovernmentAffairs/3890/TestimonyofDaleDHumburgChiefBiologist.html.
75. See generally ASS’N OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS, RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR A NATIONAL WETLANDS AND CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVE (2009), available at
http://www.aswm.org/calendar/wetlands2008/recommendations_2008_112008.
pdf.

23

KIBEL

496

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

found: “Strategies for adapting coastal/estuarine wetlands to
climate change (and thereby reducing impacts to wetlands and
wetlands functions)” include . . . Acquire upland buffers to permit
coastal/estuarine wetlands to migrate when sea level rise occurs .
. . .”76
Within the NAWMP regime, climate change impacts on
coastal wetlands have recently begun to receive some limited
recognition.
The implementation and performance of the
NAWMP are overseen by a trilateral Plan Committee, whose
work centers on Joint Ventures (JVs) to further waterfowl habitat
protection.77 In February 2007, the NAWMP Plan Committee
released its Continental Progress Assessment Final Report.78 In a
section titled “New Challenges” this report stated:
The Plan Committee must plan for emerging challenges
that will face waterfowl and habitat conservation in North
America in the next decade, including the impact of global
climate change on prairie wetlands and coastal ecosystems,
and increasing development in the boreal forest. Few JVs
have actively addresses these challenges in their planning
processes. As our climate changes, will Plan continental
goals change? Impacts of sea-level rise are already evident
in coastal regions . . . We recognize that uncertainty about
future climate predictions increases at smaller geographic
scales, imposing limits on the spatial resolution of useful
climate predictions. Nonetheless, JV planners should
identify places and programs that are more or less
vulnerable to future climate change and invest accordingly
to reduce risk . . . The Plan Committee should solicit and
support studies of these broad scale challenges, and JVs
need to more actively consider these issues in conservation
plans.79
The February 2007 NAWMP Plan Committee report then
determined:
[E]xperience over the last 20 years, however, suggests that
certain approaches enhance effectiveness of the Plan’s
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
CONTINENTAL PROGRESS ASSESSMENT, supra note 67, at 2.

Id. at 44.
Id.
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conservation investments. Therefore, we recommend that .
. . (10) Global climate change must be given more

consideration in JV regional targeting, program emphasis,
and project design . . . Impact on climate change on coastal,
Arctic, boreal forest and prairie regions will be profound.
JV planners need to identify places and programs that are
vulnerable to future climatic changes and invest
accordingly to reduce risk.80
As set forth below, the February 2007 NAWMP Plan
Committee report also included a three-tiered ranking system for
the importance of recommendations, with “HHH” designations for
high-priority recommendations, “HH” designations for medium
priority recommendations, and “H” designations for low-priority
recommendations:
[R]anking Recommendations . . . members of the ASC
[Assessment Steering Committee] were asked to rank all
27 recommendations on a scale of 3 (most important) to 1
(less important) . . . (10) Global climate change should be
given more considerations in JV regional targeting,
program emphasis and project design . . . H.81
The low-priority “H” designation given to climate change
adaptation by the NAWMP’s Assessment Steering Committee
does not bode well (at least in the short-term) for the prospects for
the NAWMP regime to devote energy or resources towards
strategies to ensure that coastal wetlands for waterfowl are not
lost to sea-rise induced inundation.
Climate change has also yet to receive substantive treatment
within North America’s other continental wetlands regime, the

Memorandum of Understanding for the Conservation of
Migratory Birds and Wetlands (signed by Canada, Mexico and
the United States in 1988).82 Although the 1988 Memorandum of
Understanding has helped direct additional resources towards
wetlands protection in all three North American countries, there
is no indication that climate change impact or adaptation
80. Id. at 68-69 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 73-74 (emphasis added).
82. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Fish and Wildlife Serv., Canada, Mexico and
the U.S. Sign Memorandum of Understanding for Conservation of Migratory
Birds and Wetlands (Apr. 5, 1988) (on file with author).
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considerations have been incorporated into project selection or
funding decisions undertaken pursuant to the agreement.83
Domestically, the issue of climate change effects received
some attention in the United States federal Environmental
Protection Agency’s (EPA) 2008 National Water Program
Strategy report (discussed above).84 In the United States, the
primary regulatory program for conservation of wetlands is
section 404 of the federal Clean Water Act, which is administered
jointly by EPA and the United States Army Corps of Engineers.85
This publication acknowledged that the “primary impact of sea
level rise on water resources is the gradual inundation of natural
systems”86 in coastal and estuarine areas, and then offered the
following proposed responses to this impact:
EPA will explore how consideration of climate change
should inform significant deterioration determinations
andpublish additional guidance where appropriate.87
....
The National Water Program will work with the Army
Corps of Engineers to ensure effective implementation of
the regulatory framework under section 404 of the Clean
Water Act in a way that considers the effects of climate
change and will explore the need for additional guidance on
avoiding or minimizing impact, defining “significant
deterioration” and “unacceptable adverse impact.”88
This proposed domestic response is again vague in terms of
details, and makes no specific mention of responding to the
particular climate adaptation problem facing coastal wetlands—
inundation due to sea level rise and the corresponding need for
wetlands to migrate landward. Stronger guidance from North
America’s continental multilateral wetlands conservation regimes
might result in more effective and responsive policy at the
domestic level.

83. Id.
84. EPA, supra note 29.
85. Id. at 51-53.
86. Id. at 16.
87. Id. at 52.
88. Id.
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III. ADAPTATION ACROSS THE POND: EUROPE’S
CONTINENTAL RESPONSE
North America is not the only region where continental crossborder natural resource regimes are fashioning responses to the
effects of climate change. As discussed below, Europe is also
considering this question in several multilateral forums including
the 1992 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes (UNECE Transboundary
Watercourse Convention),89 the 1994 Convention on Cooperation
for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River
(Danube River Convention),90 and the 2000 EU Water Framework
Directive. 91
A.

Task Force on Water and Climate under the UNECE
Transboundary Watercourse Convention

In terms of the UNECE Transboundary Watercourse
Convention; November 2007 witnessed the first meeting of the
Convention’s Task Force on Water and Climate in Bonn,
Germany, followed by a second meeting in July 2008 in
Amsterdam, Netherlands, and a third meeting in November 2009
in Geneva, Switzerland.92 In connection with these meetings,
Europe’s Task Force on Water and Climate prepared a series of
advisory reports, including; Guidance Towards Climate Proofing
of Water Management (September 2007),93 Guidance on Water
and Climate Adaptation (July 2008),94 Adaptation to Climate

89. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, 1936 U.N.T.S. 269.
90. Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the
Danube River, June 29, 1994.
91. Comm’n of the European Communities, White Paper, Adaptation to

Climate Change, Adapting to Climate Change: Towards a European Framework
for Action, at 10, COM (2009) 147 final (Jan. 4, 2009).
92. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes, Draft Guidance on Water and Climate Adaptation
(July 2, 2008) [hereinafter Draft Guidance].
93. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes, Guidance Towards Climate Proofing of Water
Management (Sept. 28, 2007).
94. Draft Guidance, supra note 92.
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Change in Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia and South
Eastern Europe (July 2008),95 and Guidance on Water and
Adaptation to Climate Change (November 2009).96 Given that
Europe’s Task Force on Water and Climate was established
pursuant to a treaty on transboundary watercourses, these
reports focused mostly on cross-border river basins.
The November 2009 Guidance on Water and Adaptation to
Climate Change report noted the particular role that multilateral
transboundary regimes can play in terms of climate adaptation
policy:
Transboundary rivers, lakes and groundwaters pose
particular management challenges because of potentially
competing national interests.
Adaptation therefore
requires transboundary cooperation, based on river basins
and bio-geographics. While most measures will have to be
implemented at the national or local level, where
operational capacities exist, it is essential that efforts be
coordinated in an equitable, acceptable and cost-effective
manner at the level of the transboundary basin.97
One of the recommendations to emerge from Europe’s Task
Force on Water and Climate is the prospect for increased use of
cross-border environmental impact assessments to identify more
basin-specific climate adaptation measures. In particular, the
July 2008 Guidance on Water and Climate Adaptation and the
November 2009 Guidance on Water and Adaptation to Climate
Change report both discussed the provisions of the 1991 Espoo
Convention
on
Transboundary
Environmental
Impact
Assessment98 and suggested that such multilateral assessments
could provide a process for more rigorous analysis of how to best
anticipate and respond to the effects of climate change on

95. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes, Adaptation to Climate Change in Eastern Europe,
Caucasus, Central Asia and South Eastern Europe (July 2, 2008).
96. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., Guidance on Water and Adaptation to
Climate Change, U.N. Doc. EC/MP.WAT/30 (2009).
97. Id. at 38.
98. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context, Sept. 10, 1997, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309.
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The November 2009 Guidance on
Water and Adaptation to Climate Change report explained:

international river basins.99

The Espoo Convention supports environmentally sound and
sustainable development by providing information on the
relationship on the inter-relationship between certain
economic activities and their environmental consequences,
in particular in the transboundary context.100
....
The Espoo Convention has been supplemented by a
Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA),
not yet in force. The Protocol will require its Parties
evaluate the environmental consequences of their official
draft plans and programmes, and provides for extensive
public participation in government decision-making in
numerous development sectors. 101
....
SEA is undertaken much earlier in the decision-making
process than a project-level EIA [Environmental Impact
Assessment], and it is therefore seen a key tool supporting
sustainable development. SEA can also be an effective tool
for climate change adaptation and mitigation, by
introducing
climate
change
considerations
into
development planning.102
Another proposal presented by Europe’s Task Force on Water
and Climate in its November 2009 Guidance on Water and
Adaptation to Climate Change report was the use of
“Vulnerability Assessments” and the “Climate Vulnerability
Index” (CVI) in climate adaptation policy. As discussed in the
report:
A VA [Vulnerability Assessment] delineates the specific
places, human groups, sectors and ecosystems that are at
the highest risk, the sources of their vulnerability and how
the risk can be diminished or eliminated. So identifying
the regions and people at greatest risk and assessing the
99.
100.
101.
102.

U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., supra note 96, at 30-31.

Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 31.
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sources and causes of their vulnerability is critical for
designing and targeting adaptation.
This shows the
priorities for adaptation and helps policy-makers at various
levels decide where and when to intervene.
....
VAs should visualize what might happen to an identifiable
population, sector or ecosystem in the current situation
(current vulnerability) and under the changing conditions
projected by scenarios and models (future vulnerability).
VA should also cover the probability of these harmful
effects.103
....
To capture the essence of this definition of vulnerability, a
composite index approach is proposed . . . This could
explicitly incorporate indicators which represent the
diverse dimensions of risks which give rise to vulnerability
within a population, and this has been incorporated into a
method of assessment know as the Climate Vulnerability
Index (CVI). The objective of this method is to help identify
those areas which are most vulnerable . . . .104
As set forth by Europe’s Task Force on Water and Climate,
the use of transboundary environmental assessment, strategic
environmental assessment, vulnerability assessment and the CVI
are not stand-alone or mutually exclusive techniques. Rather,
they are presented as a suite of policy tools that can be combined
and integrated to forge a coherent set of continental and basinwide climate proofing strategies.
B.

Danube River Commission and Danube River Basin
Management Plan

In regards to the Danube, in December 2007 the
International Commission for Protection of the Danube River
(Danube River Commission) sponsored an international
conference titled Adaptation of Water Management to Effects of

103. Id. at 70.
104. Id. at 72.
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Climate Change in the Danube River Basin.105

One of the
outcomes of this 2007 conference, held in Vienna, Austria, was to
agree to include a separate chapter on climate change in the
revised Danube River Basin Management Plan (to be completed
by the end of 2009).106
In May 2009, the Danube River
Commission released its draft of the revised Danube River Basin
Management Plan, which included Section 8 titled Water
Quantity Issues and Climate Change,107 and Annex 19, titled

Summary of Eventual Main Impacts on Water Resources Due to
Climate Change and List of Selected Climate Change Projects
Relevant to the DRBD.108
Section 8 of the May 2009 draft of the revised Danube River
Basin Management Plan found that “climate change signals for
the DRB [Danube River Basin] are sufficient to act beyond
existing scientific uncertainties”109 and that “climate change in
the DRB is a significant threat to the DRB environment and
further actions need to be taken as consequence . . . it is clear
that there is still much work needed to clearly understand the
scale and magnitude of pressures and impacts, but it is obvious
that there are actions that can and must be taken now and this
should be a priority for the overall management of the DRB.”110
Annex 19 of the May 2009 draft of the revised Danube River
Basin Management Plan described nine separate research and
policy initiatives underway in Europe that relate to climate
impacts and climate adaptation in the Danube Basin, and
concluded:
In summary, respective actions need to be taken to ensure
that additional water use and flood defense measures will
105. AUSTRIAN MINISTRY FOR EUROPEAN & INT’L AFFAIRS, CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS OF WATER MANAGEMENT TO EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN
DANUBE RIVER BASIN (2007), http://www.icpdr.org/icpdr-files/14077.
106. Id. at 6.
107. INT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF THE DANUBE RIVER, DRAFT DANUBE RIVER
BASIN DISTRICT MANAGEMENT PLAN § 8.2.2 (2009), http://www.icpdr.org/icpdrfiles/15025.
108. INT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF THE DANUBE RIVER, ANNEX 19—SUMMARY
OF EVENTUAL MAIN IMPACTS ON WATER RESOURCES DUE TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND
LIST OF SELECTED CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTS RELEVANT TO THE DRBD (2009),
http://www.icpdr.org/icpdr-files/15022 [hereinafter ANNEX 19].

109. INT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF THE DANUBE RIVER, supra note 107, at 101.
110. Id.
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be climate proof in the future. Climate proof measures will
ensure that additional impacts on the aquatic environment
are prevented and the achievement of environmental
objectives ensured.111
C.

EU Water Framework Directive and Climate
Adaptation White Paper by the Commission of the
European Communities

The EU Water Framework Directive, adopted in 2000,
establishes a framework for European Community wide actions
in the field of water policy to protect inland surface waters,
coastal waters and other water resources.112 Pursuant to this
directive, work on a Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) is
underway.113
As part of the process of formulating the CIS for the EU
Water Framework Directive, a European Policy Summit on Water
was held in Brussels, Belgium in November 2008. At this
summit, there were calls for a more vigorous and focused
continental effort to address climate change adaptation in the
water sector.114 This led to the January 2009 white paper by the
Commission of the European Communities titled Adapting to
Climate Change: Towards a European Framework for Action, in
which the Commission specifically addressed the question of—
“Why is action needed at the EU level?”
Due to the regional variability and severity of climate
impact most adaptation measures will be taken at the
national, regional or local level. However these measures
can be supported and strengthened by an integrated and
coordinated approach at the EU level.
The EU has a particularly strong role when the impact of
climate change transcends the boundaries of individual
countries (e.g. river and sea basins and bio-geographic
regions). Adaptation will require solidarity among EU
111. ANNEX 19, supra note 108, at 2 (emphasis in original).
112. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., supra note 96, at 46.
113. Id.
114. EUROPEAN WATER P’SHIP, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND WATER—THE
NEED FOR STRONGER COOPERATION IN EUROPE (2009), http://www.ewp.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2009/03/20090415-report-ccaw.pdf.
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member states to ensure that disadvantaged regions and
regions most affected by climate change will be capable of
taking the measures needed to adapt.115
In its January 2009 white paper, the Commission also detailed
the establishment of a new European-wide Impact and
Adaptation Steering Group (ISAG) to formulate regional and
national climate change adaptation programs.116 The ISAG is
responsible for helping develop the common EU climate
adaptation strategy and assisting in preparation of national
adaptation strategies by EU member states.117 The release of this
January 2009 white paper was followed by a March 2009
conference (again in Brussels) titled Climate Change Adaptation
and Water: The Need for Stronger Cooperation in Europe. 118
D.

Continental Contrasts with North America

Like North America, Europe is still at a relatively early stage
in developing a regional set of policies to address the impacts of
climate change on cross-border natural resources. As noted
above, however, the issue of climate adaptation is being
addressed with greater urgency in Europe, and a stronger
consensus has emerged there that the scientific data on climate
change is now sufficient to support development of specific
adaptation policies. Europe therefore appears to be somewhat
farther along in the process of developing continental climate
adaptation policy than North America and to have set
multilateral processes in motion that should provide a foundation
for additional progress. The reasons for Europe’s more advanced
policy movement in the climate adaptation arena may be
attributable to several considerations.
First, given the larger number of countries in Europe and
given such countries’ close geographic proximity to each other,
many natural resource issues in Europe have a more direct cross115. COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHITE PAPER—ADAPTING TO
CLIMATE CHANGE: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 7 (2009),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0147:FIN:
EN:PDF (internal citations omitted).
116. Id. at 15.
117. Id.
118. EUROPEAN WATER P’SHIP, supra note 114.
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border dimension.119 For instance, many of Europe’s major river
systems (such as the Danube) travel through multiple countries
and migratory species in Europe often traverse national
borders.120
These geo-political and ecological circumstances,
which are less pronounced in North America, may have compelled
Europe to address climate adaptation at the continental level.
Second, the continental governance structures in Europe are
far more established than those in North America. In 1987, the
European Community (EC) adopted the Maastricht Treaty which
helped created the EU and provided EU institutions with explicit
law-making power to “preserve, protect and improve the quality
of the environment.”121 This evolution from the more limited
trade mandate of the EC to the more expansive mandate of the
EU is sometimes referred to as “deep integration.”122 The
continental institutions within North America remain at present
somewhat “shallow” in this regard. The institutions created
pursuant to the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), such as the North American Free Trade Commission,
have no law-making powers over environmental or natural
resource matters, nor does the North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (CEC) created under the 1993 North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.123
Unlike the institutions of the European Union, to date, the
countries of North America have tended to create multilateral
institutions, environmental and otherwise, on an “as need” basis
and often provided them with fairly limited powers. As Richard

119. ASS’N OF EUROPEAN BORDER REGIONS, GROWING REGIONS, GROWING
EUROPE: PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE OF EU COHESION POLICY 4-5
(2008), http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/conferences/4thcohesionforum/doc/con
tributions/aebr.pdf.
120. ROBERT A. ROBINSON ET AL., BTO RESEARCH REPORT 414: CLIMATE CHANGE
AND MIGRATORY SPECIES 162 (2005), http://www.sfbayjv.org/pdfs/Migratory
_wildlife_climate_BTO_9-05.pdf.
121. James J. Friedberg, Closing the Gap between Word and Deed in
European Community Environmental Policy, 15 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
2 (1993); PAUL STANTON KIBEL, THE EARTH ON TRIAL: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON
THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE 144 (1999).
122. WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, DEEPENING THE ATLANTIC: TOWARD A NEW
TRANSATLANTIC MARKETPLACE? (1996).
123. KIBEL, supra note 121, at 140-43; see generally GREENING THE AMERICAS:
NAFTA'S LESSONS FOR HEMISPHERIC TRADE (Carolyn L. Deere & Daniel C. Esty
eds., 2002).
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Kiy and John Wirth, the editors of the book Environmental
Management on North America’s Borders, observed:
[T]ransboundary environmental management [in North
America] is and continues to be highly fragmented in
nature . . . Indeed, the evolution of transboundary
environmental management mechanisms has proceeded
largely on an ad hoc and functionalist basis, tackling
discrete problems either formally or informally as these
were recognized at various time and at different levels of
government. The few comprehensive, or near comprehensive, instruments currently in place . . . function as
bilateral frameworks for an ad hoc process rather than as
integrated mechanisms for comprehensive environmental
management. The need for greater coordination and
integration of multiple disparate management activities
within the region is thus apparent.124
Lastly, during most of the past decade, the administration of
United States President George W. Bush continued to question
whether climate change was causally linked to GHG emissions
and to downplay climate change’s anticipated effects.125 The
administration of President George W. Bush also placed minimal
diplomatic emphasis on multilateral environmental efforts.126
The positions of the United States on these points did not help
provide a foundation upon which to develop a continental climate
adaptation policy in North America.

124. RICHARD KIY & JOHN WIRTH, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ON NORTH
AMERICA’S BORDERS 45 (1998).
125. Luke O’Brien, Bush Ripped on Global Warming, WIRED, Feb. 7, 2007,
available at http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2007/02/72672.
126. NORICHIKA KANIE, GOVERNANCE WITH MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS: A HEALTHY OR ILL-EQUIPPED FRAGMENTATION 67, 80 (2007)
(finding that “[t]he United States, in particular, has recently tended to impede
efforts to strengthen or deepen multilateral governance in almost all realms.
The Bush administration has clearly signaled a retreat from multilateralism, as
well as a profound disinterest in multilateral environmental governance and
sustainable development.”).
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IV. CONCLUSION: AS THE SEAS RISE AND RIVERS
RUN DRY
In connection with the December 2009 meeting in
Copenhagen, Denmark of the parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN-Water’s Task
Force on Water and Climate Change released a document
highlighting climate change impacts in the water sector.127 UNWater is an inter-agency mechanism established by the United
Nations High Level Committee on Programmes in 2003 that
works to improve coordination and coherence among UN entities
dealing with issues related to water resources.128 The UN-Water
document called for “strengthening governance” and “stronger
institutions” to address climate effects in the water sector, noting:
Water is the primary medium through which climate
change influences the Earth’s ecosystems and therefore
people’s livelihoods and well being. Already, water-related
climate change impacts are being experienced in the form
of more severe and more frequent droughts and floods.
Higher average temper-atures and changes in precipitation
and temperature extremes are projected to affect the
availability of water resources through changes in rainfall
distribution.129 Water resources and how they are managed
impact almost all aspects of society and the economy, in
particular health, food production and security, domestic
water supply and sanitation, energy, industry, and the
functioning of ecosystems.130
In recent years, Europe has begun the process of forging an
integrated and continental strategy to adapt to climate change
impacts, particularly in the water sector. The efforts undertaken
pursuant to the Task Force on Water and Climate of the UNE
Transboundary Watercourse Convention, the Danube River
Commission and the EU Water Framework Directive evidence a
strong commitment to addressing climate adaptation at the
continental level, and have established processes and institutions
that should provide a platform for this work to progress.
127.
128.
129.
130.

U.N. WATER MESSAGING DOCUMENT 1-2 (2009) (on file with author).

Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
Id.
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In North America, the Waters Treaty between Mexico and
the United States, the Pacific Salmon Treaty between Canada
and the United States, and North American Waterfowl
Management Plan between Canada, Mexico and the United
States all directly involve water resources. The Waters Treaty
between Mexico and the United States sets forth the bilateral
allocation of cross-border waterways such as the Colorado River.
The Pacific Salmon Treaty between Canada and the United
States addresses coldwater anadramous fisheries dependent on
the quantity, quality and temperature of surface freshwater. The
North American Waterfowl Management Plan addresses
migratory bird stocks whose critical habitat is often coastal
wetlands.
Notwithstanding this connection, a discernable climate
adaptation agenda within these three continental natural
resource regimes has yet to emerge. Although the question of
climate adaptation has received brief mention in recent treaty
amendments and recent diplomatic pronouncements by the
parties to such treaties, to date the governance institutions
within these regional multilateral regimes have not outlined a
coherent set of policy guidance strategies for North America’s
national governments.
The result of this inaction and these omissions at the
continental level is that, in terms of the cross-border natural
resources these North American continental regimes are designed
to conserve, important opportunities to improve climate proofing
and climate policy coherence may have been lost. The national
governments in North America are now starting to turn their
attention, belatedly, to unilateral climate adaptation efforts. A
stronger continental framework could help provide enhanced
focus, resources and urgency to such domestic efforts going
forward.
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